Why institutional reforms in Afghanistan and PNG deepened instability instead of cooperation

A new discussion paper explores how institutional design influences cooperation, competition, and conflict in developing nations. The study focuses on civil service systems in Afghanistan (2001–2021) and Papua New Guinea (PNG) since its 1975 independence. Both countries show how formal institutions can unintentionally reinforce patronage and instability when misaligned with local realities. The paper highlights how institutions shape behaviour through incentives—sometimes fostering conflict rather than cooperation. In Afghanistan, post-2001 reforms aimed at rebuilding governance but instead created rivalries within key institutions. The National Unity Government, formed as a power-sharing deal, weakened the civil service by deepening internal divisions.

In PNG, repeated shifts between centralisation and decentralisation disrupted coordination. Reforms intended to improve service delivery often stalled due to political interference and weak enforcement. Both countries saw patronage networks dominate institutional functions, undermining impartial administration. The findings suggest that formal institutional design alone is not enough. Reforms must account for historical, political, and social contexts to avoid unintended consequences. Without addressing underlying incentives, even well-intended changes can fail or backfire.

The study concludes that effective state institutions depend on more than structural blueprints. Ignoring local incentives and power dynamics risks reinforcing instability and clientelism. For Afghanistan and PNG, lasting reform requires aligning institutional design with the realities of governance on the ground.